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Jamming the Law: Improvisational Theatre 
and the ‘Spontaneity’ of Judgment
Sara Ramshaw1
Modern ‘nonscripted ’ theatre (NST)2 clearly owes much to 
improvisation. Perhaps less obviously, and more surprisingly, so too 
does modern law.3 In this article I will contend that, despite all the 
rules of evidence and procedure, statutes and legal precedents4 that 
fundamentally govern the decisions and actions of a judge, it is only 
through ‘spontaneity’5 that judgment can take place. This claim may 
appear strange to those well-versed in the common law tradition6 
which proceeds on the basis of past legal decisions, or reason where no 
precedent exists.7 NST, on the other hand, is assumed to rely heavily 
on the unprecedented and unreasoned. Therefore, when the public 
watches a NST production, it places its faith in the belief that what is 
being observed is entirely new and is being produced ‘on the spur of 
the moment’.8
The dominant understanding of the common law tradition is 
complicated by the fact that no two cases appearing before a court 
for judgment can be exactly the same. There will always be some 
distinction or dissimilarity; no two actions take place at the exact 
same time, with the exact same parties and the exact same factual 
situations. This distinction forms the basis of the adversary system9 in 
which two opposing sides struggle to convince a judge or jury that her 
or his interpretation of the case law, statute or regulation is the most 
persuasive and should be accepted as ‘the truth’. Cases that are strikingly 
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similar to previous decisions rarely make it before a judge because, if it 
is impossible to contradict or distinguish a past precedent, the outcome 
will basically be known or guaranteed in advance and settlement out 
of court, to save on the enormous expense of adjudication, would most 
likely be suggested and encouraged. Thus, each judicial application of 
existing rules or past precedents to new facts creates, in fact, a new and 
improvised law. Novelty and creativity, however, must be subordinated 
to tradition and precedent in order for law to remain legitimate and 
commanding in contemporary society. Law, in other words, cannot be 
seen to be produced ‘on the spur of the moment’. To be just, it must 
apply fairly and equally and be known by all in advance (Pue 2000: 17).
While not disputing the importance of fairness and equality 
in relation to law, this article calls for increased recognition of the 
improvised creativity that is at the heart of legal reasoning. It matters 
not whether the case to be decided is criminal,10 civil,11 procedural,12 
substantive,13 decided from the bench,14 communicated through written 
reasons — in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada or elsewhere 
in the common law world15 — or decided by a panel of judges, at the 
trial or the appellate level.16 It is the very nature of legal judgment, the 
making of a decision, that elicits a negotiation between the singularity 
of a particular case and the pre-existing rules or laws — be it case law, 
statute law, laws of evidence and procedure — to which it must adhere 
or follow. This process of negotiation is also one of translation: the 
judgment or decision must present the novel and new as comprehensible 
in light of current modes of legal thinking and understanding. Thus, 
the ‘spontaneity’ of judgment is not so much about temporality as it 
is about translation and negotiation between the novel (singular) and 
the pre-existent (general), the individual (case) and the collective (law).
To better understand the ‘spontaneous’ elements of judgment, 
improvisation is theorised here through NST, which dispels the myth 
that creativity in improvisation is the result of an unconscious mind or 
lone genius. Instead, improvisation exists only in relation to a collective 
or community, to pre-existing rules or protocols, to the actions or words 
of audience members or fellow actors on stage. In this article, the judge 
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takes on the role of ‘nonscripted actor’ in the theatre of the courtroom 
drama. While the storytelling in which the judge engages is not, 
strictly-speaking, extempore, the act of judgment entails improvising 
on past precedent to ensure that the singularity and uniqueness of each 
case is made comprehensible through the more generalised law already 
in existence. ‘Spontaneity’ in legal judgment, borrowing from NST 
and critical studies in improvisation, calls for a far more nuanced and 
complex conceptualisation of improvisation than simply extempore 
or spur of the moment action or decision. The freedom of the judge 
to decide is neither limitless nor completely constrained. Judgment 
involves a negotiation between the singularity or otherness of the 
individual case and the generality of pre-existing laws and precedents. 
Legal improvisation must thus take into account the community within 
which the judgment is being made and therefore entails ‘ jamming’ or 
‘creative group performance’ (Sawyer 2006), as will be explained below. 
Conceived this way, the creativity of law is less about the individual 
will of the judge (or judicial activism17) and more about what decision 
is most just in the light of the circumstances and audience18 concerned.
Improvisation in Theatre
Although improvisation is not completely foreign to performance in 
scripted theatre, it is more often used during the rehearsal process 
to assist actors in developing their roles (Easty 1966: 109). It is a 
preparatory technique, a tool in an actor’s training and a means for 
discovering the subtext of a script. Improvisation ‘is not customarily 
utilized in performance, except at times of crisis, when something 
has gone wrong and an actor must “ad lib”’ (Fox 2003: 94). While no 
performance, rehearsal or reading can be exactly the same every time 
it is performed, which suggests the inclusion of some improvisational 
elements, actors will generally aspire to consistency and predictability 
in a performance and fear, perhaps even despise, surprise.19
NST, on the other hand, provides the necessary critical approach 
to and analysis of ‘spontaneity’ and improvisation. It includes many 
forms such as Theatre of the Oppressed (Boal 1985), Theatresports 
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(Johnstone 1979; Weibe 2005: 42-3), Action Theatre (Zaporah 1995). 
For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on Playback Theatre 
(Fox 2003; Fox and Dauber 1999) as a form of improvisational theatre 
in which audience members tell stories about particular events in their 
lives and these stories are ‘played back’ or ‘recreated and given artistic 
shape and coherence’ (IPTN20) by the actors on stage (Fox 2003: 3).
The decision to concentrate on this type of theatre stems, in part, 
from its resemblance to the legal case:
In the Playback method, members of the community tell their stories 
in the public sphere instead of just to trusted family, friends, or 
neighbours in private spaces, and the actors decide how to perform 
the story — which elements to emphasize or omit (Meer 2007: 107).
This mirrors the private stories told by litigants in the public 
courtroom and the decisions of lawyers who dictate which elements of 
the story will be highlighted or ignored. Of course, Playback does not 
replicate the legal case precisely. In this form of improvised theatre, 
actors must perform ‘spontaneously’, without discussion or negotiation, 
and ‘work collectively to retell the story as authentically as possible’ 
(107). The storytelling, which takes place in the courtroom, is rarely 
extempore or without discussion or negotiation, and it aims not towards 
authenticity per se (although the story told is supposed to be authentic 
and truthful), but towards persuasiveness and reason. As such, it is not 
necessarily the spontaneous storytelling, but the negotiation, that takes 
place in Playback Theatre between the singular and the general, the 
individual and the collective21 that makes it an intriguing comparator 
when examining the creativity of legal judgment.22 Finally, much has 
been written by the founders of Playback Theatre about its workings 
and the meaning of ‘spontaneity’ in acting. This analysis is extremely 
useful for dispelling many of the myths surrounding the process and 
conceptualisation of improvisation and is another reason for the focus 
on Playback Theatre in this article.
One further caveat is required before beginning the analysis. This 
article is concerned with law, not with theatre. The ensuing discussion 
of improvised theatre is thus being used to mount an argument about 
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law, not illuminate the practice of Playback Theatre. As such, it relies 
heavily upon the claims made about the practice and process of Playback 
Theatre by its founders and participants. And while I have never actually 
witnessed such a production, the point of this article is not to argue 
that Playback Theatre actually achieves what its founders claim for 
it, but that their rhetoric reveals, metaphorically at least, something 
interesting about the practice of law.23
Playback Theatre — Background
The original Playback Theatre Company began in New York City 
(NYC) in 1975, with Jonathan Fox as its director.24 Its aims were, and 
remain, threefold: (1) to reach out to its audience; (2) to bring theatre 
closer to everyday reality; and (3) to break away from the tradition of 
scripted theatre. Playback is influenced by community ritual and theatre 
and the oral tradition of storytelling and psychodrama, especially the 
use of improvisation and the release of creative energy and notions 
of inclusiveness, where every individual has a place in the collective 
(IPTN). Although there is no script, there is a ‘rhythm and sequence’ 
to a Playback Theatre performance:
A Conductor is the host and facilitator of the process. After a period 
of introduction and warming up, someone will volunteer to tell a 
story. It could be a short moment, or about a longer event. They may 
be past, present or future stories. They could be about a very special 
time or about something that happens everyday. In the course of a 
performance 3, 4 or 5, maybe more, people will come forward to tell 
a story in this way. Towards the end of a performance, the Conductor 
may invite reflections on the process, and the team will create some 
sort of closure appropriate for the event (IPTN).
The person telling the story is called the ‘Teller’. She or he leaves the 
audience area and sits in the Teller’s chair. The story is told from there, 
with the support of the ‘Conductor’. During the ‘Interview’ stage, the 
Teller chooses actors to play roles in the story. As each actor is chosen, 
she or he stands. The story begins and the Conductor says, ‘Let’s watch’. 
This is the cue for the performers to begin enacting the story. Music 
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may provide atmosphere and mood; boxes or chairs may be used to 
define the space. During the performance, the actors ‘spontaneously 
improvise a re-enactment of the story, and this may happen in different 
artistic forms, aiming to present and capture the essence and heart of 
the story’. The performance ends with the actors looking to the Teller 
in an act of acknowledgment. During the ‘Closure’ stage, the Teller 
has an opportunity to say more if they are so moved. Sometimes the 
Teller is offered the chance to correct or transform the scene; the actors 
replay it accordingly. The Conductor then thanks the Teller and she or 
he returns to her or his seat. Another person is invited to tell the next 
story, and so on (IPTN).
‘Spontaneity’ in Playback Theatre
‘Spontaneity’ plays a large role in Playback Theatre. According to 
its creators, the practice of Playback Theatre is characterised by ‘[a]
uthenticity in the spontaneous moment’ (IPTN); it ‘challenges the 
actors to listen, allow intuition and inspiration to arise, trust and 
support each other, and to call upon their innate personal wisdom 
and experience’ (IPTN). In addition to the acting and theatre skills, 
personal awareness and self-development are keys to becoming a 
talented Playback actor.
For its creator, Jonathan Fox, the success of a Playback Theatre 
performance depends on ‘spontaneity’, which, for him, ‘is deeply 
associated with action and a definite type of nonthinking’ (Fox 2003: 
79, emphasis in original). Fox describes ‘spontaneity’ in relation to four 
key features. The first is vitality:
Persons who do not hold back and are able to express themselves 
directly convey a sense of aliveness. They move, they laugh, they 
surprise, they shine. They convey an appealing warmth or magnetism 
that is evident from the instant they enter the hall (80, emphasis in 
original).
The second is appropriateness:
The idea of spontaneity as heedless impulse belittles the potential 
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of the concept. … The actor with spontaneity … will always have a 
measure of the situation, will be adequate in any role, and will know 
when to blend in and when to stand out (80).
The third is intuitiveness:
The spontaneous nonscripted actor, unrestricted by a playwright’s lines, 
can say whatever comes, often producing word and action as stunning 
à propos as it is unexpected. Thus an actor with a trained imagination 
and with full access to his or her senses has available a wide range of 
expressive possibilities (80).
Finally, the actors must display a readiness for change:
In a nontextual situation, the unexpected is a way of life. To deal with 
irregularity in a creative way requires an ability to accept each moment 
as it comes and respond dynamically. Most important of all is to accept 
the idea of living constantly with the unforeseen (80-1).
Fox’s signs of ‘spontaneity’, outlined above, resonate with the 
work of other critical theorists of improvisation such as Fischlin and 
Heble (2003, 2004), who view improvisation as a complex ‘social 
practice’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 14), a ‘provocation to avoid stasis’ 
(13) and a ‘resistance to orthodoxies’ (11). Where Fox is less rigorous 
and convincing, though, is in his analysis of those factors that resist 
the ‘spontaneous’. According to Fox, such ‘blocks’ to ‘spontaneity’ 
are: (1) knowledge ‘… the desire to know often acts as an impediment 
to spontaneity’ (Fox 2003: 83, emphasis in original); (2) planning 
‘The unspontaneous actor will often want to decide ahead of time 
exactly what will happen’ (83); and (3) analysis ‘The analytical actor 
will interpret the scene instead of entering into it, and the portrayal 
will have a heady, undynamic feel’ (83-4). Fox’s advice for attaining 
‘spontaneity’, then, is: ‘Don’t ask questions, don’t plan, don’t analyse’ (84, 
emphasis added).
One of the primary aims of critical studies in improvisation25 has 
been to challenge the conception of improvisation as requiring ‘no 
prior thought’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 23), as adhering to ‘neither 
convention nor protocol’ (23), and as being primarily concerned with 
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the ‘unblocking of obstacles that impede access to forms of individual 
self-expression’ (23). Fox too admits that even NST such as Playback 
is ‘wary of fully embracing the idea of spontaneity’ where it is viewed 
solely as ‘unplanned action’ (Fox 2003: 85). ‘Spontaneity’, he argues, 
is ‘made possible by adherence to the ritual ’ (Fox and Dauber 1999: 
7, emphasis added): ‘The sameness of the ritual allows, paradoxically, 
for tellers to take risks, often surprising themselves by the story that 
emerges’ (Fox 2003: 263). The ritual creates a framework for the process 
which enables the unpredictable to occur:
When the ritual is held well by the conductor and the performers, 
there is a subconscious sense of safety amongst the audience. And in 
this atmosphere, the most profound as well as the most mundane of 
personal stories will feel welcomed and honoured (IPTN).
Although there is no written script to guide the action, Playback 
Theatre is not without its conceptual ‘frames’. For Fox, the ‘frame’ 
refers to ‘a category of understanding, a principal theme of [the] 
story-of-the moment, an appreciation of which will guide decisions 
for action’ (Fox 2003: 91-2). Fox explains the ‘frames’ in relation to 
certain dichotomies which, for him, are unsettled by the ‘spontaneous’. 
Of particular relevance to this discussion is the dichotomy between 
structure and freedom. Improvisation is often conceived as complete 
freedom in opposition to the structure associated with, for example, 
scripted theatre. To quote Fox:
In considering ‘improvisation,’ there is a definite connotation of second 
best associated with the word, according to which one is distinctly at 
a disadvantage when one has to improvise, be it a poem or a solution 
(Fox 2003: 94, emphasis in original).
The extemporaneous play is both aesthetically and expressively 
devalued: ‘The plot won’t add up, there will be loose ends, the 
characterizations will be thin. Nor is it likely to look very good — no 
chance here for breathtaking costumes, backdrops, or lighting effects’ 
(95). Any experience of the unknown, with which improvisation 
confronts us, is thereby discouraged in contemporary theatre and 
culture (95). And yet it is the unknown and the possibility of failure, 
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which makes success possible in the world of improvisation: ‘Failure 
is not the poison but the spice of oral composition’ (96).
What Fox, and other critical theorists of improvisation, appreciate 
is that ‘even for improvisation, a certain level of structure is necessary’ 
(96). NST groups practice improvisation within ‘structured contexts’ 
(96): ‘Teachers of creative drama develop a method for their sessions. 
… The comic-satire actors perform structured theatre “games,” which, 
if not “rehearsed,” are intensively practiced’ (96-7). Therefore, Playback 
Theatre is itself intensely structured around a framework consisting of 
an opening, a closing and scenes in between involving the interview, 
the setting-up, the enactment, and the acknowledgment (97).
A further distinguishing characteristic of improvisation is that the 
framework for action is set up so that it can be superseded:
At that instant, a metacommunicative frame surrounding both original 
and new will encapsulate both and give the occasion meaning. The 
exciting part is that this ‘superframe’ of understanding is never known 
beforehand. There is an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability 
which Turner describes with the word ‘liminal’ (Fox 2003: 98).
‘Spontaneity’, then, can be thought of as a ‘creative response to a 
liminal condition’ (99). Once again, as Fox explains:
What is most important, then, in discussing structure and freedom in 
the theatre is not that there must be structure, nor that there must be 
freedom, but that there be established a condition of liminality between 
the two states. Thus, seeing a play, with all its structure, can be a liminal 
experience, while seeing a happening, which is “spontaneous,” can be 
deadening. Any combination is possible so long as it falls within a 
spectrum at the extremes of which are the anomie of excessive freedom 
and the dispirited productivity of rigid structure (99).
If liminality and risk are feared due to a lack of confidence, the 
NST performance will also be lacking. No matter how experienced 
or talented an actor may be, without the ‘courage to consciously seek 
out a liminal moment’ (101), she or he will be unable to confront ‘the 
heart of darkness in a story’ (101). Therefore, the Playback performer 
will walk ‘steadfastly towards liminality’ (101) in order to ‘go all the 
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way with a story’ (101) and, ‘[i]n the presence of such full spontaneity, 
audience attention is intense’ (101).
‘Spontaneity’ thereby requires being both in the moment, animal-
like, with senses open to information from the environment, and 
standing outside the moment to make sense of what is occurring. 
Only then can action be taken and this action in turn creates a new 
environmental condition. ‘Spontaneity’, as Fox explains, is thus ‘the 
ability to maintain a free-flowing constantly self-adjusting cycle of 
sensory input, evaluation, and action’ (101), not simply ‘quickness of 
action’ (101, emphasis in original). It is envisaged as ‘choice of action’ 
(101, emphasis in original).
This conceptualisation of ‘spontaneity’ as choice, as opposed to 
unthinking or unplanned action, is important to the discussion on law 
and justice below. Improvisation may involve play or playfulness, but it 
also calls upon our highest intelligence (102), ‘where the nonrational 
and rational are comprehended in an understanding which surpasses 
the understanding of each’ (90). ‘Spontaneity’ entails both experiencing 
and understanding the moment; it brings the audience and actors 
together in a shared experience of ‘involvement and purpose’ (91). The 
‘spontaneous’ integrates and provides a ‘sense of culture as connecting’ 
(91, emphasis in original). Improvisation is therefore not simply or 
solely an expression of the individual unconscious but, as Bateson says, 
‘it is concerned with the relation between the levels of communication’ 
(quoted at 91, emphasis in original).
Justice as ‘Spontaneity’
Much has been written on the theatrical aspects of law or the 
relationship between law and theatre or law as performance (see, for 
example, Rogers 2008, Stone Peters 2008, Balkin and Levinson 1999, 
Balkin 2003). Very little academic literature exists, however, on the 
topic of law, justice and improvisation.26 Modern law, as reasoned and 
rule-bound, is often viewed as antithetical to improvisation (Soules 
2004: 270). Legal precedent, for example, encourages the view that 
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judges should not spontaneously invent law and any judicial activism 
should be controlled or reined-in. Nitta (2001) explains:
One of the most important values in our political system is that all 
people should be subject to ‘rules of law and not merely the opinions 
of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office.’ The 
doctrines of precedent and stare decisis support this value by: (1) 
fostering impartiality by providing a neutral source of authority by 
which judges must justify their decisions and (2) limiting the actual 
impact that a single person has on shaping the law. Therefore, by 
offering a framework in which judges must decide a case, precedent 
minimizes the influence of personal bias or beliefs on judicial decisions 
and consequently promotes the public’s faith in our system of justice 
(Nitta 2001: 798-9, citations omitted).
Precedent thereby limits the scope of judicial power. It restricts the 
role of a judge to determine the law in each case, ‘not according to his 
[or her] own judgment, but according to the known laws’ (809). Nitta 
argues that ‘[j]udicial power, therefore, does not allow a judge to invent 
laws, but to determine only what the law is in accordance with laws 
previously pronounced’ (809-10). Moreover, precedent is often viewed 
as integral to justice; it ‘encourages the public to have faith that justice 
will be done and consequently allows the public to trust their affairs 
to the adjudication of the courts’ (Nitta 2001: 798).
Not only is judgment limited by precedent, courtroom decisions 
must adhere to rules of evidence and procedure. In fact, on its face, 
the common law seems to hold very little room for improvisation and 
spontaneity. And yet, it is also the case that every judicial act is, in 
some sense, improvised. As no two actions can be exactly the same, 
judges ‘make new law’ (Dworkin 1986: 6) every time they are asked 
to decide a case. These legal performances are unique events, ‘never 
merely a rehearsal on a different stage’ (Davies 1996: 97-8). Law can 
thus neither dispense with, nor be completely determined by, the device 
of precedent (Deutscher 2005: 98). In the words of Rogers, ‘[w]hile 
norms and legal precedents may be applied they must be re-read, re-
created or re-constructed for each new set of circumstances’ (Rogers 
2008: 431). The legal decision thus always contains the possibility of 
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being ‘otherwise’ (Fitzpatrick 2001: 89). However, the improvised 
aspects of law must be subordinated to the known, to legal precedent 
and tradition, in order to endure as authoritative and commanding in 
Western society.
Accepting the view offered above that ‘spontaneity ’ and 
improvisation are far more complex than typically conceived — 
‘improvisation is too good to leave to chance’ (Paul Simon, quoted in 
Fischlin and Heble 2004: 31) — and acknowledging that judges do 
improvise on the law when asked to decide a case, what does a critical 
study of improvisation, such as that proposed by NST, add to our 
discussion of law and justice?
For the late French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, law, to be just, 
cannot be but improvised and ‘spontaneous’. In his article ‘Force of Law: 
The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’, Derrida unpacks the ‘difficult 
and unstable distinction between justice and law’ (Derrida 2002a: 250), 
which he likens to the ‘problematic relation between the singular and 
the general’ (Attridge 1992a: 181; see also Derrida 1992: 187). Justice 
— ‘infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, 
heterogeneous and heterotropic’ (Derrida 2002a: 250) — is positioned 
as singularity (248) in opposition to a more generalised law. Derrida 
explains: ‘Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an 
absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or 
ought to guarantee absolutely’ (251). Justice, in other words, to be truly 
just, can never be known in advance; to be completely faithful to the 
singularity of the other, it must be spontaneous and improvised in nature.
Improvisation as the purely singular is, as noted above, an 
impossibility, and justice can never be totally ‘spontaneous’ in nature. 
Just as improvisational theatre requires a frame or ritual from which to 
depart in order to be improvisation, justice can only be revealed through 
law, through ‘a system of regulated and coded prescriptions’ (Derrida 
2002a: 250, emphasis added), which is constituted solely in terms of 
its ‘generality’ (245) and ‘universality’ (245). Justice, in other words, is 
‘dependent on the determinate presence effected by the legal decision’ 
(Fitzpatrick 2005a: 4). As Derrida explains: ‘No justice is exercised, no 
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justice is rendered, no justice becomes effective nor does it determine 
itself in the form of law, without a decision’ (Derrida 2002a: 252).
Conversely, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, law needs 
justice as singularity in order to remain legitimate and authoritative 
in Western society. According to Peter Fitzpatrick, law ‘cannot be … 
enduringly ordered and predictable’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 8). If it were, 
‘there could be no call for decision, for determination, for law’ (9). 
Instead, for law to endure, it requires a simultaneous ‘responsiveness’ 
(9), an ‘attunement and attentiveness to what is beyond’ (9). Law, argues 
Fitzpatrick, must be able to ‘change and adapt to such other things as 
“society”, or “history”’ (9; see also Fitzpatrick 2005b: 464). Moreover, 
this responsiveness to the other of law is ‘essential for law’ (Fitzpatrick 
2005a: 9, emphasis added).
If law needs justice and justice needs ‘spontaneity’ then law needs 
improvisation to be just. Not a purely singular or extemporaneous 
improvisation — for such is impossible. Instead, it is an improvisation 
that requires law as much as the converse is true. To help explain, and by 
definition, improvisation must ‘overflow, overlook, transgress, negate’ 
(Derrida 1989: 41) that from where it comes, be it a frame or ritual. 
Improvisation, in other words, may be constituted by originality, but 
its recognition as improvisation is wholly dependent on those laws and 
codes it transgresses (Attridge 1992b: 310). Improvisation thus needs 
to be with law to be improvised. Its originality, in other words, can only 
be ‘display[ed]’ (Derrida 1989: 27) and brought into presence or made 
present, through law, through that from which it departs.
Conversely, law needs improvisation to remain properly 
commanding in Western society. As revealed by Derrida (2002a) in 
the paper ‘Force of Law’:
To be just, the decision of the judge, for example, must not only follow 
a rule of law or a general law [loi] but must also assume it, approve it, 
confirm its value, by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if, at the 
limit, the law [loi] did not exist previously — as if the judge himself 
invented it in each case. Each exercise of justice as law can be just 
only if it is a ‘ fresh judgment’ (Derrida 2002a: 251, emphasis added).
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Such improvised elements in law ensure that it never becomes 
completely or ‘perfectly stilled’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 9; Fitzpatrick 2003: 
58). In its concern for otherness and the new, improvisation effectively 
sustains the need for decision, sustains the need for law (Fitzpatrick 
2005a: 9; Fitzpatrick 2003: 58). If law’s content was completely lacking 
in improvisation, or was ‘perfectly stilled’ (Fitzpatrick 2005a: 9), ‘it 
would cease to rule the situation that would inexorably change around 
it’ (9). If judgment, in other words, was always known in advance, there 
would be no need for decision, or for law.
The Art of Jamming: The Individual and the 
Collective
Admittedly, not all improvisation is creative. However, if one takes the 
position, à la Derrida above, that it is only through improvisational 
creativity that the (im)possibility27 of justice can be realised, 
what remains is an unpacking of the cultural myths (surrounding 
improvisation and creativity) that impede societal acceptance of the 
image of judge as improviser. Some of these myths include the idea that 
improvisational creativity ‘is a burst of inspiration from a lone genius; 
that a person working alone is always more creative than a group; 
and that social conventions and expectations always interfere with 
creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 259). What Sawyer’s work on ‘creative group 
performance’ makes evident is that creative and just improvisation ‘is 
fundamentally social and collaborative’ (257); ‘it involves preparation, 
training, and hard work’ (257) and ‘the process is more important than 
the product or the personality’ (257).
Creative group performance is often referred to as ‘ jamming’ (3). 
To use the term ‘ jamming’ in relation to law may seem strange, not the 
least because of its social history and meaning. The term was first used 
by jazz musicians to indicate an ‘impromptu gathering of musicians 
with the purpose of improvising together’ (3). It is often emphasised 
that it was in jam sessions, such as those in New York City or elsewhere 
in the US, that great improvising jazz musicians — Charlie Parker, 
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for instance — honed the art of the improvised solo. The notion that 
improvised creativity is a ‘solo art’ (Green 1966: 40) is critiqued by 
musicians and actors alike. Improvisation is often portrayed as ‘merely 
the expression of individual freedom’ (Stewart 2003: 96) or something 
actors and musicians ‘do “off the top of their heads”’ (96). Creative group 
performance, that is, improvisation, though, is a communal effort and 
is judged in relation to the collective performance as a whole.
This is one of the paradoxes of improvised creativity. The improvising 
performer ‘works with and against the group at the same time’ (Jones 
1991: 48). It involves a ‘delicate balance’ being struck ‘between [a] 
strong individual personality and the group’ (Ellison 1953: 189). The 
US writer, Ralph Ellison, describes the jam session as ‘a marvel of social 
organization’ (189). It is a ‘cruel contradiction’ (234), he writes, that 
an improviser must ‘lose his [or her!] identity even as he finds it’ (234) 
and ‘each solo flight, or improvisation, represents … a definition of his 
identity: as an individual, as a member of the collectivity and as a link 
in the chain of tradition’ (234). The creativity of any improviser then, 
instead of being illimitably free and unconstrained, depends on the group 
and the community within which he or she is improvising for meaning.
The term, jamming, typically connotes a positive experience. As R 
K Sawyer (2006) explains:
… when a performance goes particularly well, the musicians might 
say ‘we were really jamming tonight.’ In the last several decades, 
the term has been widely used outside of jazz to describe any free-
flowing creative group interaction. … For example, actress Valerie 
Harper, who began her career at the Second City, Chicago’s legendary 
improvisational theater, said ‘I’ve always found improvisation … to 
be close to jazz musicians jamming — you’re really listening to each 
other, really hearing’. … The American Heritage Dictionary (1982) 
defined the jam session as both a type of jazz performance and also as 
‘an impromptu or highly informal discussion.’ The Harvard Business 
School professor John Kao referred to work teams as jamming when 
they are effective and innovative (Sawyer 2006: 3, citations omitted).
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Jamming, however, also entails a violence, as expressed by the term 
‘cutting contests’, in which musicians engaged during jam sessions as 
a form of ‘musical duelling’ (Belgrad 1989: 180). ‘Cutting’ tested the 
‘skill and creativity’ (180) of the individual musicians and it was in 
these ‘cutting contests’ that ‘musicians established and maintained a 
hierarchy of professional competence’ (DeVeaux 1997: 209).28
Marshall Soules (2004) writes on the violent contradiction of 
jamming in relation to both acting and music:
The complex negotiation of identity within a performance context — 
whether the art be music, acting, writing, or performance of self in 
everyday life — pits individual freedoms against the constraints and 
opportunities of society’ (Soules 2004: 268).
Each assertion of individuality is challenged by the collective and 
requires much ‘commitment, courage, and risk-taking’ (268) by 
the improvising performer. The violence or cruelty done to the 
individual, however, is simultaneously marked by an ‘affirmation … 
of … implacable necessity’ (Derrida 2001: 292; see also Soules 2004: 
268). Violence, in other words, not only renders individual expression 
expressible, but also ensures the possibility of this expression being 
other than what it is. This ‘cruel contradiction’ (Soules 2004: 269), 
which ‘threatens to erase the traces of identity’ (269), also ‘animates 
improvisation’ (269) and enables it to thrive:
… both improvising musicians and actors must lose their identities even 
as they find them, but they do so within a framework of productive 
constraints — the protocols of improvisation. In a seeming paradox 
that threatens to erase the traces of identity, improvisation thrives when 
the performance of character is given latitude of expression within the 
framework of the ensemble (Soules 2004: 269).
These protocols — the ‘“long established codes” determining 
“precedence and precisely correct procedure”’ (270) — act as law. Thus, 
while it ‘may at first seem antithetical to popular notions of improvised 
creativity’ (270), improvisation can only exist in relation to these 
‘voluntary constraints’ (270) and to law.
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The paradox that animates improvisation not only applies to 
improvised theatre, but to scripted acting as well. Citing renowned 
Russian actor and teacher, Michael Chekhov, Soules writes:
Every role offers an actor the opportunity to improvise, to collaborate 
and truly co-create with the author and director. This suggestion, of 
course, does not imply improvising new lines or substituting business 
for that outlined by the director. On the contrary. The given lines and 
the business are the firm bases upon which the actor must and can 
develop his improvisations. How he speaks the lines and how he fulfills 
the business are the open gates to a vast field of improvisation. The 
‘hows’ of his lines and business are the ways in which he can express 
himself freely (quoted at 269, emphasis in Soules).
The laws of ‘lines and business’ in scripted theatre may be more explicit, 
but even performances as ‘radically improvisational’ (270) as Ornette 
Coleman’s Free Jazz are not without some constraints. The protocols 
or laws governing the music in this particular recording are outlined 
in Martin William’s liner notes to the album:
Not only is the improvisation almost total, it is frequently collective, 
involving all eight men at once. And there were no preconceptions as 
to themes, chord patterns or chorus lengths. The guide for each soloist 
was a brief ensemble part which introduces him and which gave him an 
area of musical pitch (Williams 1998: 2-3, emphasis added).
Improvisation is accordingly ‘not typified by unrestrained freedom’ 
(Soules 2004: 271) and instead requires a constant mindfulness as to 
how the individual improvisations are determining or influencing the 
performance as a whole. Ornette Coleman explains this further in 
relation to his Free Jazz recording:
The most important thing … was for us to play together, all at the 
same time, without getting in each other’s way, and also have enough 
room for each player to ad lib alone — and to follow this idea for the 
duration of the album (quoted in Williams 1998: 3).
Improvisation in both music and theatre demands a ‘constant 
negotiation between the freedoms accorded to the individual improviser 
and those of the group as a whole’ (Stewart 2003: 93). It requires both 
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‘individual responsibility for the sounds [or actions] produced and 
collective responsibility for the overall performance’ (Prévost 2004: 
358). Creative improvisation accordingly provides ‘the means towards 
both individual self-fashioning and communal liberation’ (Gilroy 2000: 
497, emphasis added).
‘Spontaneity’ in legal judgment similarly calls for a constant 
negotiation between the freedom of the judge to take account of the 
otherness or singularity of the case and the existing laws or rules, which 
both allow and constrain that freedom. Instead of being illimitably 
free to make any decision, the judge improvises in relation to the law 
that already exists and to the society and community (the audience) 
for whom she or he is judging. Conceived this way, the creativity of 
law becomes less suspect and allows for the possibility of ‘spontaneity’ 
that is just and desired. ‘Jamming’ the law requires, amongst other 
things, ‘deep listening’29 (Oliveros 2005), that is, the ‘intense form of 
commitment and responsibility to — as well as interaction with — all 
that surrounds us: people, environments, nature, the sounds of daily 
life’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 11). It demands attunement, not only to 
the singularity of the situation, but also to the context and community 
within which the judgment is made. By listening deeply to the personal 
stories of others, we may begin to understand ‘our story as a community 
of people and thus tap into the collective and universal experience’ 
(IPTN). Social action, in other words, makes ‘spontaneity’ possible, 
which in turn enables social change and transformation as space is 
made ‘for the stories of the community, through individual voices’, 
and their effects on us (IPTN).
Law as Creative Group Performance
As with Playback Theatre, modern law plays back stories in the 
courtroom with a view to translating individual experiences into a 
form understandable by the collective (Fox 2003: 263). The uniqueness 
of each story or case is made meaningful through its translation into 
pre-existing rules of evidence, procedure, precedent and general legal 
principles. The judge takes on the role of ‘nonscripted actor’ in this play, 
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improvising on the story to make it comprehensible to the collective 
(fellow judges, lawyers and other legal audiences). However, the 
‘spontaneity’ of the judgment is not illimitable. Its singularity is only 
meaningful when translated through the law already in existence. Thus, 
improvisation in law is never completely unknown and unpredictable.
Recognising the importance of ‘spontaneity’ in judgment entails 
a concurrent appreciation of the importance of ‘creative group 
performance’ or ‘group creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 3-4) in law. As a 
‘living, practiced tradition’ (245), which is by nature collaborative and 
creative, law insists on the ‘[i]mprovisational creativity’ (245) of both 
the individual performer (judge) and the performance community or 
audience. Law, like theatre, is an ‘ensemble art’ (Sawyer 2006: 252). 
No one law, statute, or judge comprises the whole of ‘law’ and each 
individual judgment is a product of ‘changing interactions’ (252) with 
the collective. These changing interactions are, by their very designation, 
at least somewhat unpredictable and improvised.
Read as improvisation, law becomes a ‘social practice’ that is 
‘predicated on the exploration of alternative (and alterative) modes 
of being in community’ (Fischlin and Heble 2004: 13), of being in 
and with others in society. It is for this reason, and for the ‘hope and 
possibility’ (11) that come from ‘envisionings of possibilities excluded 
from conventional systems of thought’ (11), that ‘spontaneity’ in judgment 
should be welcomed and encouraged. In its ‘resistance to orthodoxies’ 
(11), improvisation in law, as in theatre and music, has the potential to 
produce new ways of knowing and being in the world. In unpacking the 
law’s ‘lived reality of creativity’ (Sawyer 2006: 259) as that which is ‘almost 
never a solitary activity’ (259), but is instead ‘fundamentally social and 
collaborative’ (259), it is obvious that law, like Playback Theatre, has the 
potential to ‘build communities that have been torn asunder’ (Fox 1986: 
263) and to bring about positive and necessary change in contemporary 
society. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, its optimism, instead of 
being feared, denied or discouraged, legal improvisation — as jamming 




1 Deepest gratitude is offered to the Editors of this Special Issue, Marett 
Leiboff and Sophie Nield, for their support and assistance throughout the 
process of writing this article, as well as the engagement and suggestions 
of the participants at Law’s Theatrical Presence Workshop in London, 
England on 5 December 2009, namely Patrícia Branco, Sophie Nield, 
Theron Schmidt, Karen Walton and Graham White. I would also like 
to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive comments 
on the original draft and, as always, thanks to Eugene McNamee for his 
insightful feedback and discussion on the ideas offered herein.
2 With no script guiding the performance, ‘nonscripted’ actors utilise 
improvisational acting techniques to stage stories extemporaneously.
3 The concept ‘modern law’ denotes the ‘traditional representation [of] the 
discipline of law’ as ‘always, in the last instance, an enterprise in strict 
reason or logic and human social behaviour’ and, correspondingly, ‘as 
the consequence of reasoned intentions and explicitly formulated goals’ 
(Goodrich 1986: 545). For a critique of this vision of law in modernity, 
see Goodrich (1986) and Fitzpatrick (1992).
4 In common law legal systems, a legal precedent or authority is a previous 
legal case or decision, establishing a principle or rule, which a judge or 
other judicial body may (and, at times, must) follow when deciding a 
subsequent case with similar issues or facts. Precedent, as will be described 
in further detail in Section 4, is founded on the principle that ‘like cases 
will be treated alike, and that similarly situated individuals are subject to 
the same legal consequences’ (Rehnquist 1986: 347).
5 Placing ‘spontaneity’ in quotation marks signifies a departure from the 
dominant societal or dictionary definition of spontaneity as ‘involuntary, 
not due to conscious volition’ (OERD 1996: 1400).
6 The Common Law, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is ‘a body of law 
that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from 
legislative enactments’ (Black 1990: 276). In contrast, a Civil Law legal 
system features laws that are written and collected or codified through 
legislative enactments as opposed to judges (246).
7 In instances where a dispute is fundamentally distinct from all previous 
cases, judges have the authority and duty to make new law. This is called 
primae impressionis, a ‘case of a new kind, to which no established principle 
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of law or precedent directly applies, and which must be decided entirely 
by reason as distinguished from authority’ (Black 1990: 1189).
8 The word ‘improvisation’ is derived from the Latin improvisus, which 
‘refers to the ‘unforeseen’ or that which occurs ‘on the spur of the moment”’ 
(Alterhaug 2004: 98).
9 Adversary system is defined by Black as ‘The jurisprudential network of 
laws, rules and procedures characterized by opposing parties who contend 
against each other for a result favorable to themselves. In such system, the 
judge acts as an independent magistrate rather than prosecutor’ (Black 
1990: 53).
10 Criminal or penal laws refer to all the statutes (federal and, in some 
countries, state laws) that ‘def ine criminal offenses and specify 
corresponding fines and punishment’ (Black 1990: 1133).
11 Civil law is a body of law that is concerned with ‘civil or private rights and 
remedies, as contrasted with criminal law’ (Black 1990: 246).
12 Procedural law prescribes the manner in which rights and duties among 
and for persons, natural or otherwise, may be exercised and enforced in a 
court (Black 1990: 1203).
13 As distinguished from procedural law, substantive law fixes duties and 
establishes rights and duties among and for persons, natural or otherwise 
(Black 1990: 1203).
14 Judgment is given immediately after hearing the arguments while the 
judge is still sitting in court.
15 Common law countries can trace their legal heritage to England as former 
colonies of the British Empire. They include Australia, Cameroon, Canada, 
Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United States of America.
16 My deepest appreciation is offered to the anonymous reviewer who forced 
me to consider these distinctions and their relationship to judgment.
17 Activist courts, Bork argues, ‘announce principles and reach decisions 
not plausibly derived from the Constitution [and other pre-existing laws]’ 
(Bork 2003: 19). Such invention of law ‘from whole cloth’ (Baker 2002: 
140) is seen to ‘rightfully undermine our confidence in courts’ (140) and 
give judges licence ‘to do what they please’ (Kaufman 1980: 81).
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18 The audience plays a large role in both theatre and law. Unfortunately, 
there is not space enough in this article to give this issue proper attention.
19 One example of this comes from my own experience. Several years ago, I 
was cast as Katharina in a community theatre production of Shakespeare’s 
Taming of the Shrew. In one rehearsal close to the opening of the production, 
the Director, as a joke, asked me to throw a pie in the face of Gremio in 
the final scene (Act 5, Scene 2) during Kate’s ‘Fie, fie!’ monologue. The 
actor playing Gremio, who was probably the most experienced and talented 
in the ensemble and had a great sense of humour and adventure, instead 
of being amused by the surprise, reacted very angrily and stormed off the 
stage. He explained later that it was not the pie in the face that angered 
him, but the improvised divergence from the scripted and rehearsed 
action, which wrenched him out of character and forced him to lose his 
concentration and forget his next action.
20 This is taken from the International Playback Theatre Network (IPTN) 
website: http://www.playbacknet.org. The IPTN was established in 1990 
by Jonathan Fox, Jo Salas and Judy Swallow to ‘facilitate communication 
between playback practitioners and guide the playback movement’ (Fox 
and Dauber 1999: 12).
21 In Playback Theatre, according to its founders, ‘each person’s uniqueness is 
honoured and affirmed while at the same time building and strengthening 
our connections to each other as a community of people’ (IPTN).
22 To be explained later, in relation to Jacques Derrida’s writings on law and 
justice, legal judgment is being conceived here as the aporetic relation 
between singularity and generality, individuality and collectivity.
23 Much of this caveat is taken from the report of one anonymous reviewer. 
I agree wholeheartedly with the statements and offer thanks for the 
sentiments expressed therein.
24 Playback Theatre is now practised in at least 30 countries (Fox and Dauber 
1999: 13).
25 For information on this new field of interdisciplinary research, see the 
‘Improvisation, Community and Social Practice’ Research Project, funded 
by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada 




26 A recent edition of the journal Critical Studies in Improvisation is dedicated 
to the theme of ‘Law, Justice and Improvisation’. See Piper and Waterman 
(2010).
27 ‘(Im)possibility’ is read through the Derridean concept of différance, 
or the ‘formal play of differences’ (Derrida 2002b: 26), ‘of traces’ (26), 
which ‘forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be 
present in and of itself, referring only to itself ’ (26, emphasis in original). 
Impossibility is, for Derrida, ‘not the opposite of the possible’ (Beardsworth 
1996: 26, emphasis in original). Instead, it ‘supports’ (Derrida 2005: 91) 
and ‘releases the possible’ (Beardsworth 1996: 26, emphasis in original). 
Impossibility and failure, in other words, contain the trace or promise of 
possibility. In its failure, possibility survives.
28 Reputations were both made and broken in these jam sessions. One of the 
most celebrated ordeals was when drummer Jo Jones ‘threw his high-hat 
cymbal on the floor of the Reno Club in Kansas City to make it clear to 
a struggling teenaged Charlie Parker that he most emphatically did not 
belong – yet’ (DeVeaux 1997: 214, emphasis in original). In response to 
this humiliation, Parker went home and stayed there, practising, for three 
months – until he knew what he was doing (227). Thus, for young musicians 
still learning their craft, the ‘competitive give-and-take of “cutting”’ 
(Belgrad 1989: 180) was ‘as much a part of their training as practising 
scales’ (DeVeaux 1997: 211).
29 According to the Deep Listening Institute’s website: 
 Deep Listening® is a philosophy and practice developed by Pauline 
Oliveros that distinguishes the difference between the involuntary nature 
of hearing and the voluntary selective nature of listening. The result of the 
practice cultivates appreciation of sounds on a heightened level, expanding 
the potential for connection and interaction with one’s environment, 
technology and performance with others in music and related arts. 
For more information, see http://www.deeplistening.org/site/about.
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